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Abstract: The EU territorial cohesion policy with the Lisbon reform has been enriched with an 
additional tool: macro-regional strategies. They represent an integrated framework that allows the 
Union and the Member States to identify needs and respond to them using available resources in such 
a way that the macro-region can benefit from a sustainable environment and optimal socio-economic 
development. In essence, the Member States and third countries that share a certain natural asset (sea, 
river, mountain range, etc.) can coordinate their resources to address common challenges and achieve 
shared objectives, according to a multi-level governance approach. The aim of our work is to 
reconstruct the concept of multi-level governance and the process of creating a macro-regional 
strategy by analyzing existing strategies and taking stock of future ones. Finally, we will look at the 
prospects of these instruments, taking into account the possible evolutionary scenarios of the EU. 
Keywords: MLG; European cohesion; EUSDR; EUSALP; EUSAIR; DSP; European integration 
 
1. Introduction 
The evolution of the process of European integration has brought out two 
interconnected problematic issues in the pluralist systems, rectius European-with 
regard to the political choice concerning the distribution and ways of exercising 
power: a regional question in the European legal system and a European question 
in the constitutional arrangements of the federal and regional Member States. In 
both issues under the attention of legislators, jurists and judges are the relevant 
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legal profiles in the relations between regional autonomies, state authorities and EU 
Institutions. 
In speciem, in recent years the EU has envisaged a new form of territorial 
cooperation between Member States and third countries, ie macro-regional 
strategies. With the first strategy created in 2009, for the Baltic Sea region, the 
process of enhancing cross-border, interregional and above all transnational 
cooperation has been further defined: the Union1 with the important contribution of 
the Council of Europe-already from different years had started and encouraged 
with the establishment of the Euroregions2, the Working Communities and the 
European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) (Caesar, 2017, p. 249ss)3. 
Although the launch of the macro-regional strategies is quite recent, they appear to 
be an instrument appreciated by the Member States (and others) to achieve specific 
objectives in certain strategic sectors such as economic and employment growth, 
improved transport and energy supply, protecting the environment, increasing 
tourist attractiveness, increasing safety in the affected area, supporting research and 
innovation, trying to understand if the European Union can and will take a path of 
macro-regionalization with greater conviction or he will prefer to slow down this 
trend and concentrate on consolidating and improving the functioning of already 
operational strategies (Salageanu, 2016, p. 57ss). 
 
2. What is Multi-Level Governance? 
The concept of multi-level governance (MLG)4 arose within the framework of the 
theories elaborated to give an explanation to two phenomena: the process of 
                                                   
1 B. Wassenberg & B. Reitel, Territorial cooperation in Europe: A historical perspective, Publication 
coordinated by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2015. M. Haus, Governance-Theorien und 
Governance-Probleme. Diesseits und jenseits des Steuerungsparadigmas, in Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift, 51(3), 2010, pp. 458ss. M. Zürn, Global governance as multi-level governance, in 
D. Levi-FaUR (ed.), Oxford handbook of governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 
2 V. Biot, The European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): An asset for territorial 
governance towards territorial integration?, in G. Gorzelak, K. Zawalińska (eds), European territories: 
From cooperation to integration? ESPON & EUROREG-Centre for European Regional and Local 
Studies, University of Warsaw, 2013. 
3 E. Evrard & A. Engl (2018). Taking stock of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 
(EGTC): From policy formulation to policy implementation. In E. MedeiroS (eds) European territorial 
cooperation. The Urban Book Series, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2018. 
4 See, E.U. Petersmann, Multilevel constitutionalims for multilevel governance of public goods, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. N. Cwodhury, R.A. Wessel, Conceptualising 
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European integration and the functioning of a complex and composite system like 
that of the European Union. A theory that presented itself as a sort of “third way” 
to explain these two realities and which “challenged” the two classic approaches, 
namely intergovernmental and neo-functionalist approaches. This theory, although 
not exempt from criticism (Jordan, 2001, pp. 193-208; Bache, 2012), on the one 
hand tried to make a synthesis of the two approaches, on the other hand it advanced 
a relatively new interpretive scheme that subsequently had a good fortune. The 
MLG has had the merit of asking fundamental questions about the mechanisms 
through which the various actors present in a given political-institutional arena 
make the decisions and the implications that they entail for democratic 
accountability.1 MLG “has made a significant contribution to understanding the 
nature of governance in the EU”.2  
That an empirical case such as that of the European Union could be a source of 
inspiration for approaches of this kind is highlighted, reflecting on the legal nature 
of the Union that “(...) is transforming politics and government at the European and 
national levels into a system of multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative and 
apolitical governance, via a complex web of public/private networks and quasi-
autonomous agencies, which is primarily concerned with the re-regulation and de-
regulation of the market” (Hix, 1998, p. 54ss.). A multi-level governance, 
therefore, understood as a system of continuous negotiation between governments 
located at different territorial-supranational, national, regional and local levels-as 
the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decision-making 
reallocation that has made so that some functions previously centralized in the 
State, became the preserve of other levels of government, specifically the 
supranational level and the regional and local levels. 
                                                                                                                                 
multilevel regulation in the European Union: A legal translation of multilevel governance? In 
European Law Journal, 18(3), 2012. H.J. Bieling, M. Lerch, Theories der europäischen integration, 
ed. Springer, 2012, pp. 188ss. 
1 G. Marks, Structural policy in the European Community, in A. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics: 
Institutions and policymaking in the “new” European Community, Washington D.C., 1992, pp. 191-
224, C. Panara & R. Varney, Multi level governance in the European Union and European Union 
democracy: Democratic legitimacy, democratic accountability and transparency of the european 
offices of the english authorities in Brussels, in Regional & Federal Studies, 27(2), 2017, pp. 154ss. 
2 I. Bache, Multi-level governance in the European Union, in D. Levi-Faur (edited by), The oxford 
handbook of governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 638ss. 
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The MLG model had brought out a new reality, summarized: the skills within the 
decision-making are shared by actors distributed at different levels rather than 
monopolized by national governments; collective decision-making between states 
implies a significant loss of control over it by individual national governments; the 
MLG model foresees that the political arenas are interconnected and that in this 
framework sub-national actors do not operate by interfacing only with the national 
arenas, but also directly with the supranational ones (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 
1996, pp. 342-378). The state does not monopolize the connections between 
domestic (sub-national) and European (supranational) actors, but it represents one 
among the various subjects in the field that actively participate in the decision-
making process. 
If by MLG we mean that particular process in which there are negotiated and non-
hierarchical exchanges between institutions at transnational, national, regional and 
local levels where there is a stratification of governance processes at these different 
levels (Peters & Pierre, 2001, pp. 131-132). Thus, we can speak of “flexible 
governance”1 as a system that allows policy-makers to regulate the scale of 
governance to reflect the heterogeneity of a complex political and legal system 
(such as, among others, the Union). (Hooghe & Marks, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 
2003, p. 234ss) The MLG whose theoretical foundation is federalism, is 
characterized by the presence of few jurisdictional levels that pursue general aims. 
There are no overlaps between levels, which, even if communicating, remain 
separate and indeed arranged on a pyramidal and hierarchical basis. The MLG that 
derives its theoretical root mainly from neoclassical political economy and from 
the theory of public choice, has opposite characteristics. It does not place particular 
emphasis on the institutional structure, but is oriented towards problem solving and 
therefore has a rather flexible and policy-oriented design. The political-institutional 
framework and the public and private entities that operate within it appear to be 
composite and fragmented, and this poses no small challenges to a central 
supranational institution in the European regulatory framework such as the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (Tatham, 2015). To this type of MLG, 
                                                   
1 See the Charter for multilevel governance in Europe adopted by the Committee of Regions on 3 
April 2014 and supported by the Congress of local and regional authorities of the Council of Europe. 
CEMP 2018 work programme. Political and thematic priorities of Council of European Municipalities 
and Regions. European section of United cities and local governments, 18-19 January, Zaragoza, 
2018. M. Lebrun, Multileval governance as way towards a more involved, in European View, 13 (1), 
2014. 
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Conzelmann records the policy-making of the European Union1, while Skelcher 
points out that it also fits well in a wider arena such as the international one 
(Skelcher, 2005, p. 14ss). Another convincing definition of multi-level governance 
was provided by Schmitter who, highlighting the equal importance of all the actors 
and their close interconnection aimed at the adoption of binding decisions for all, 
defined it as “an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a 
multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent public-private 
and public-at different levels of territorial aggregation in more or less continuous 
negotiation/deliberation/implementation, a stable hierarchy of political authority”2. 
In turn, Piattoni spoke of multi-level governance as a diversified set of agreements, 
an intertwining of systems of coordination and negotiation between formally 
independent but functionally interdependent subjects that stand out in complex 
relationships between them and that through the coordination el in negotiation, they 
redefine these relationships each time. Adding, among other things, that on the one 
                                                   
1 T. Conzelmann, Towards a new concept of multi-level governance?, in Committee of the Regions, 
The Contributions to the 2008 Ateliers, Brussels, Forward Studies/Cellule de Prospective, 10 
September 2008 also with reference to problematic aspects linked, for example, to the territorial 
dimension, which is relevant to MLG and which is in contradiction with the more general concept of 
governance. In fact, in the latter case, the most important issues are functional interdependence and 
the solution of common problems, rather than geographical interdependence. The author in the final 
paragraph dedicated to the recommendations to improve the MLG at the European level, called for a 
further strengthening of the Committee of the Regions and in general of the regions and cities to 
propose themselves as “subnational networks” of which the EU urgently needs for the definition and 
implementation of its policies. It also encouraged the respect and follow-up of the protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, which 
specifies that regional and local actors must be consulted before the Commission proposes the acts to 
be adopted by the European legislator, European Parliament and Council. 
2 Invalid source specified., which would later be back on the subject and, after specifying that the 
European Union can not be considered a federation or a confederation, but a sui generis system based 
on multilevel and polycentric governance, asserts that it, more precisely, is a unique combination 
properties such as governance, multi-layered governance and poly-centric governance. The former is 
defined as a method/mechanism for dealing with a wide range of problems and conflicts in which the 
actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfying and binding decisions negotiating and deliberating with 
each of the parties involved and cooperating in the implementation of the decisions themselves. The 
second, multi-layered governance, in essence multi-level governance but with other words, takes up 
the definition already illustrated, while the third, poly-centric governance, is an agreement aimed at 
making binding decisions for a multiplicity of actors. delegating authority on certain tasks to a 
number of relatively autonomous agencies that are controlled - de jure or de facto - by a single 
collective institution. 
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hand the MLG represents a theory of political mobilization (politics)1, the adoption 
of a decision following a specific policy-making (policy) and the structuring of a 
political system (polity), on the other hand that the levels connected to it are on the 
other hand, the levels linked to it are territorial (supranational, national and sub-
national) and jurisdictional2. 
So the MLG is a system of adoption of a decision that takes into account all 
government bodies, even and above all sub-national, which in many EU Member 
States and in the same Union have acquired greater powers and prerogatives 
following the institutional and constitutional reforms implemented in the twenty 
years 1990-20003. The MLG has been descriptive as a division of the authoritative 
powers on several levels of the territory and, in the specific case of European 
integration, indicative of a model of relationship between the subnational level of 
government of the member states and the European institutions. Basically, on the 
one hand the power dissolves between “central and institutions” above and 
“below”, on the other the ML “is not a division of powers, but rather a process of 
power sharing”4. For this reason, a model of this kind, according to our opinion, is 
                                                   
1 S. Hix & B. Høylad, The political system of the European Union, ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2011. S. Piattoni, Multi-level governance in the EU. Does it work? Globalization and 
Politics: A Conference in Honor of Suzanne Berger, MIT, May 8 and 9, 2009, pp. 12ss. 
2 S. Piattoni, Multi-level governance in the EU. Does it work? Globalization and Politics: A 
Conference in Honor of Suzanne Berger, op. cit. 
3 In this regard, let us bear in mind, for example, the activism of sub-national governing bodies, such 
as Regions, Provinces and Municipalities, in that particular area of European territorial cooperation 
which is cross-border cooperation. If political-administrative entities and in some legal cases such as 
the Euroregions, the European associations between territorial bodies and the working communities 
can not be considered real levels to be introduced in the European governance (with reference to the 
EU) and internationally (with reference to the Council of Europe), it is also true that some of them 
play a minor role in the distribution of Community funds, acting as managing authorities, and in any 
case, having representation offices in Brussels, try to fit in some way in the choices of Union policies 
and to lobby for gains and rewards. Moreover, in the specific case of the European Territorial 
Cooperation Groups (EGTCs), which always belong to cross-border cooperation, the Committee of 
the Regions expressed itself in unequivocal terms, speaking of “a real laboratory of multilevel 
governance” (Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on Develop a European culture of multilevel 
governance: initiatives to follow up the White Paper of the Committee of the Regions, 2012/C 113/1 
of 18.4.2012, par. 51). 
4 D. Gal & I. Horga, Multilevel Governance from the Lisbon Treaty to the White Paper of Multilevel 
Governance, in Revista de Estudios Jurídicos, Universidad de Jaén (España), n. 10, 2010 (Segunda 
Época). The authors, moreover, emphasize the role played by multi-level governance mechanisms in 
achieving the goal of territorial cohesion in the EU, the importance of cooperation between national 
parliaments of the Member States for the democratic system of the Union, in accordance also the 
enhanced role reserved to them by the Treaty of Lisbon in controlling the effective respect of the 
principle of subsidiarity, and, finally, the centrality of the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality 
and partnership, as well as the open method of coordination 
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particularly suitable to reduce the manifestations of a complex system to unity in 
which no level of government assumes an exclusive centrality and excluding the 
other levels, in which participation, flexibility, cooperation are the keys time for 
the construction of political decisions. 
For MLG it is meant “a specification of the concept of governance that emphasizes 
the creation (structural aspect) of government levels of supra-or sub-national 
jurisdictional amplitude and their involvement (procedural aspect) in the decisional 
and implementation processes generated by challenges internal and external to the 
power of control and government of the nation-states, so it could be used to 
describe relations between national states and international organizations as well as 
relations between national governments and sub-national governments”1. In this 
sense, we mean that sub-national levels of government interface directly with the 
supranational level represented by the European Union and they do so both in the 
ascending phase of definition and regulation, and in the downward phase of 
implementation of these and of policies in the territories easily verifiable if one 
goes to investigate the ever higher propensity subnational agencies (regions in the 
first place) to open representative offices and offices in Brussels and to practice a 
real paradiplomacy through which to make their voices heard more (Cugusi & 
Stocchiero, 2010, p. 5ss)24. This allows these actors to exert pressure on the 
European decision maker. Consider, for example, the question of the European 
Structural and Investment Funds and the negotiation that oversees their discipline 
in which actors of different nature participate in accordance with the principles of 
partnership, subsidiarity and proportionality. 
 
3. Macro-Regional Strategy and the “Role” of Macro-Region. 
“Macro-region” and “macroregional strategy” being relatively recent concepts 
must necessarily be defined as precisely as possible. A first important definition of 
the two concepts was given by the EU itself-by the European Commission (EC) in 
particular-because the supranational entity intended to provide a framework for 
structured cooperation between Member States and non-regions, local authorities 
                                                   
1 M. Tatham, With or without you? Revisiting territorial state-bypassing in EU interest representation, 
in P. Mair & J. Thomassen (eds), Political Representation and European Union Governance, ed. 
Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 78ss. 
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and bearers of public and private interests in the same area who face common 
challenges, experience similar problems and intend to achieve the same objectives. 
Although some have adopted a prudent approach in their doctrine, pointing out that 
“macro-regions appear to be many things in one” (Stead, 2014, pp. 680-693; Stead, 
2014, p. 326ss.), speaking of macroregion as “soft policy space” (Dubois, Hedin, 
Schmitt, & Sterling, 2009) and going back to the term used for international 
relations, the EC has specified that for macroregion an area consisting of a number 
of administrative regions should be understood, but these present sufficient 
common problems to justify the adoption of a single strategic approach or, in other 
words, “an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions 
associated with one or more common features or challenges (...) it is not essential 
that the limits of the region be precisely defined”281. The now consolidated 
definition has not been “fabricated in vitro”, but has been built on the basis of the 
proposals and challenges that emerged during the preparation of the EU strategy 
for the Baltic Sea region (Dubois, Hedin, Schmitt, & Sterling, 2009)29. The macro-
region is not a classically understood administrative region. If the latter is a 
territorial governing body provided for by the Constitution of a State, the macro-
region is not covered by the Treaties of the European Union, those which, not 
without some difficulty, can be defined as the constitutional rules of the Union. 
The macro-region does not have autonomous political, administrative and financial 
characteristics, but represents a political-territorial unit based on the criterion of 
functionality, which supports a perspective oriented towards the achievement of 
precise results set by the subjects that are part of it (Dubois, Hedin, Schmitt, & 
Sterling, 2009)30. Hettne, for example, has framed them in the broader context of 
the erosion of the monopoly role played on the international chessboard by the 
nation-states2 and has pointed out that some strongly periodizing historical factors-
above all the end of the so-called Cold War-helped to create a new global scenario 
that led to a particular form of new regionalism3, highlighting the overcoming of 
the state-microregional paradigm and the landing at a macro-regional level placed 
                                                   
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009)248 final, p. 6. 
2 B. Hettne, Globalization and the new regionalism: The second great transformation. In B. Hettne, 
A. Inotai, O. Sunkel (a cura di), Globalism and New Regionalism, ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstone, 1999. 
3 F. Söderbaum, Exploring the links between micro-regionalism and macro-regionalism. In M. 
Farrell, B. Hettne & L. Van Langenhove (eds), Global politics of regionalism. Theory and practics. 
Pluto Press, London, 2005, pp. 88ss. 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
13 
 
between the state and the global model1. Macro-regional strategies can make a 
contribution to the redefinition of geographic and political relationships inside the 
EU according to natural, social and economic functionalities, beyond 
administrative borders, and also through the development of a “macro-regional 
consciousness”, based on identity and solidarity elements”2. 
On the other hand, with regard to the macro-regional strategy, it is firstly necessary 
to refer to the official definition provided by the EU, where the EC states that a 
macro-regional strategy should be understood as “an integrated framework 
allowing the European Union and the Member States, thanks to the coordination of 
relevant policies, identify needs and respond to them using available resources (...) 
enjoy a sustainable environment and optimal socio-economic development”3. 
Indicative is the fact that, faced with the launch of the first macro-regional strategy-
that for the Baltic Sea-which took place in 2009, again in 2011 the Council asked 
the EC to clarify the notion of macro-regional strategy4. The EC responded to this 
request by specifying that the macro-regional strategy is an integrated framework 
for Member States and third countries in the same geographical area which faces 
common challenges and benefits from enhanced cooperation for economic, social 
and territorial cohesion537 and takes into and feeds on principles of integration, 
coordination, cooperation, multilevel governance and partnership6. Furthermore, he 
explained that “(...) the macro-regional approach offers an integrated framework to 
tackle challenges that are too large to manage on a national scale but are too 
                                                   
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final, pp. 5. 
2 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 13 April 2011, par. 20. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final, pp. 5. 
4 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the added value of macro-regional strategies, 
COM (2013) 468 final p. 3. 
5 H. Heinelt & M. Knodt (Hrsg.) Policies within the EU multi-level systems. Instruments and 
strategies of european governance, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2012) 128 final, 23.3.2012, p. 3. As is well known, the European Union at that 
time consisted of 27 States, as Croatia would have joined the following year, precisely on 1 July 
2013. 
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specific for the EU (...)”1. The concept is even more specific contained in the 
regulation on the European Structural and Investment Funds for the new 
programming period (2014-2020)2.  
The essential elements that can be found in a macro-regional strategy are: the 
multi-level and multi-actor approach, the place-based approach and the integrated 
approach3. The multi-level approach means that in the elaboration and 
implementation of strategies a whole series of actors, Europeans, nationals, sub-
nationals, public and private, including civil society organizations and other 
stakeholders. It is evident that the multi-actor consists in strategies that must take 
into consideration the interests, needs and challenges of the territory around which 
they come to organize themselves and on the basis of these arrange for the agreed 
solutions to achieve common objectives. The integrated approach concerns a 
common response of all the actors who, in pursuing the same interests and pursuing 
the same objectives, integrate the actions, policies and funding programs in order to 
improve their effectiveness in reacting to transnational challenges and problems. 
and cross-border difficult to solve on their own. The macro-regional strategies of 
the Union make it possible to test a new type of cooperation operating from the 
perspective that prefers common challenges to a plurality of specific regions, in an 
environmental, economic or security key, by virtue of the theory that provides joint 
programming and actions to address common problems through the effective use of 
available funds. Precisely because the macro-region is an entity that acts according 
to the principle of functionality4, it is essential to understand which and how many 
actors involved in the strategy and which criteria to use for their identification. So 
there is a problem of delimitation of the geographical scale of macro-regions that 
must lead to the choice of which countries and territories to include in the strategy. 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the territorial cohesion dimension5 to the already 
existing economic and social cohesion, the Union has the legal basis for the 
establishment of these new political instruments contributing to the implementation 
                                                   
1 Regulation (EU) n. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European 
Maritime Fund, and fisheries and general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, 
on the European Social Fund, on the Cohesion Fund and on the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund, and repealing Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 of the Council. 
2 See in particular art. 2. 
3 E. Medeiros (eds), European territorial cooperation, op. cit. 
4 See in particular Invalid source specified.. 
5 E. Medeiros (eds) European territorial cooperation, op. cit. 
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of the European cohesion policy. In fact, by entering this framework, macro-
regional strategies become a tool for achieving the EU’s most important goals, 
starting with the Europe 2020 strategy, and at the same time supporting the multi-
level governance of the Union, since macroregions can derive a new way of 
conceiving multilevel governance and subsidiarity. A macro-regional strategy 
“represents a political governance experiment for creating an integrated framework 
of multilevel and multi-sector actions and actors (...) it is a political innovation 
because it is a new multilevel governance mechanism.”1 The macro-regional 
approach is nourished by all forms of territorial cooperation and has even allowed 
transnational cooperation to be removed from the scope of mere intergovernmental 
cooperation and in some way led to the multi-level governance of the EU by 
providing a stronger role for institutions supranationals, in particular EC (Duhr, 
2011). If the macro-regional approach can not be considered trivially a different 
name for territorial cohesion, it is clear that there are points of contact between the 
two concepts, because “each is place-based, inclusive and, in principle, prepared 
and implemented on a multi-level basis”2. 
 
4. Towards a political, practical and flexible process: The case of a macro-
regional strategy of the European Union 
There is no codified procedure established at the level of the EU. There is still (and 
perhaps there will never be) a Regulation or an operating manual or guidelines to 
follow to create a macro-regional strategy. In fact, for the Baltic Sea, the creation 
of a macro-regional strategy has qualified as a distinctly political process that sees 
the necessary intervention of the EU, but which is substantially undertaken by 
public and private, institutional and civil society actors, who they are interested in 
preparing such a tool, presented and approved. This political process does not take 
place outside the law and in the absence of rules, but develops in an institutional 
context established by the treaties and which involves the intervention of the 
political institutions of the Union at certain moments of the institute process. The 
European Council invites the EC to present a strategy for a given macro-region, 
                                                   
1 A. Stocchiero, The geopolitical game of the European Union strategy for macro-regions: Where 
does the Mediterranean Stand? in CeSPI, Working Papers, 74/2010, July 2010, pp. 7. 
2 P. Samecki, Macro-regional strategies in the EU-A Discussion Paper, Stockholm, September 2009, 
p. 3. 
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generally also indicating the time limit within which this step must be fulfilled. It 
should also be emphasized that, before this step, both the territorial actors of the 
areas involved and the European Parliament (EP) can provide input for the 
preparation of a macro-regional Union strategy. With regard to the former, 
according to a typical bottom-up, multi-level and multi-actor approach, public and 
private stakeholders promote various initiatives to promote the widest possible 
participation in order to boost the strategy1. As for the EP, it can adopt a formal 
act-for example a resolution-that encourages the creation of a macro-regional 
strategy. The EP intervention takes place following the moral suasion2 activity or 
real lobbying put in place by the MEPs coming from the different Member States 
interested in the macro-region and self-organizing in a parliamentary intergroup3.  
In the launch of a macro-regional strategy, the pre-existing instruments and 
mechanisms of transnational and cross-border cooperation that the States and the 
regional bodies involved play a major role. In fact, at the time of their 
establishment, all the current macro-regional strategies had more than one. On the 
one hand they represented a goad for the Union to recognize the need to establish a 
macro-region for that determined area, on the other hand they have become 
instruments for implementing strategies, either by incorporating them into the 
strategy or by keeping them outside but by establishing them a relationship of 
mutual collaboration for the achievement of the respective objectives. Among the 
most relevant results of the consultation, it emerged that no new institutions should 
be created, as cooperation instruments were already in place in the region, without 
considering that new structures could result in “additional administrative overheads 
                                                   
1 Recall that the European Council “gives the Union the impetus necessary for its development and 
defines its general political orientations and priorities” (Article 15, paragraph 1 of the TEU) and also 
“identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” (Article 22, paragraph 1 of the TEU). 
2 Here again the story of the macro-regional Baltic Sea Strategy (EUSBSR) has been paradigmatic 
and has been constantly and obstinately encouraged and advocated by the action of the Euro-Baltic 
Intergroup created in 2004 by members of the European Parliament from the Baltic countries. 
3 The consultation process promoted and coordinated by the Commission in the case of the Baltic 
macro-regional strategy is emblematic. There were three ways in which stakeholders of the area were 
involved, namely: the presentation of informal documents prepared by governments and other official 
bodies in the region; events and public events that brought together stakeholders and allowed 
authorities, NGOs and the private sector to bring their point of view and expertise; public consultation 
on the Europa website, which has registered a wide and widespread participation. See 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final, p. 11. 
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without contributing to greater effectiveness of the action”150. Furthermore, the EC 
specified that good political coordination (hence NO to new Institutions), a more 
effective application of Community legislation (thus NO to new rules) and a better 
co-ordination of funding instruments (ie NO to new financing). This circumstance 
has corroborated the idea that macro-regions have a soft and functionally oriented 
nature2, but has also attracted considerable criticism: the thorniest issue concerns 
the prohibition to foresee new financing, it has been pointed out, in fact, as a tool 
Such cooperation projects, which have very ambitious objectives, should be 
supported with autonomous financial allocations within the EU budget and should 
be included in the multiannual financial framework3.  
Although the rule of the three NO is a constant of the macro-regional strategies, 
both the Council and the European Council have tried to soften their rigidities by 
introducing the so-called rule of the three YES. Indeed, the Council reiterated that 
the strategy largely depends on a coordinated approach, on synergistic effects, on 
more effective use and on the alignment of EU instruments and funds from another 
source4. The European Council, on the other hand, has called for constant research 
into the complementarity of funding, the coordination of the institutions involved 
and their tools and the definition of new projects. It is clear that the three “bans” 
are much heavier than the three “concessions”, which do not add anything but a 
general encouragement to make the most of what the EU and the Member States 
make available for the success of a strategy. On the one hand, however, the 
situation remains the same for the future, in particular for the next multiannual 
financial framework; on the other hand, in the meantime, the dialectic between 
“prohibitions” and “concessions” could be aimed at finding a balance to be defined 
in the regulations relating to the territorial cohesion policy5. 
                                                   
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final, pp. 11. 
2 E. Medeiros (eds) European territorial cooperation, op. cit. 
3 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 13 April 2011, wordedly in the conclusions of 15 
November 2011, which, inter alia, invited the Commission and the Member States concerned to better 
match the existing financial resources in the macro-region with the objectives of the macro-regional 
strategies (in this case, the Baltic strategy was explicitly referred to). 
4 European Parliament report of 27 June 2012 on the evolution of EU macro-regional strategies: 
current practices and future prospects, in particular in the Mediterranean, Committee on Regional 
Development, rapporteur: François Alfonsi (A7-0219/2012), p. 14. 
5 Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 June 2011, EUCO 23/1/11 REV 1. 
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5. A Macro-Regional Strategy: The Fundamental Elements 
In fact, in the Communication and in the 2009 action plan, the EC specified what 
the fundamental and basic features should be around which to organize, develop 
and implement the Baltic strategy1. The starting point is the definition of the 
challenges that the macro-region is facing. Closely related to the challenges, the 
opportunities presented by the macro-region must be selected, ie the potential to be 
exploited to respond in a concrete and effective way to the challenges and achieve 
the objectives set by the strategy. Both the challenges and the opportunities 
generally emerge from public consultations. After that, the other essential element 
is the answer we want to give to face the challenges and make the most of 
opportunities. In this regard, the action plan is presented, an operational tool for 
every action taken by the actors in the framework of the strategy. Bearing witness 
to the operational, necessarily pragmatic and flexible nature of this document, the 
plan is periodically assessed and possibly modified to adapt it to any new situations 
created in the macro-region and to the results achieved or missed by the strategy2. 
A fundamental element of a macro-regional strategy is obviously governance, that 
is, the organizational and procedural structure that it is given in order to function. 
Being a multilevel governance model, all the parties are required to make their 
contribution both in the planning phase and in the implementation phase. Except 
                                                   
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final, pp. 12. 
2 On the basis of the indications coming from the strategic communication and the action plan, the 
general objectives, the priority areas of intervention, the horizontal/transversal actions/policies and 
the overall governance of the strategy are defined in detail. The general objectives represent the c.d. 
pillars of the strategy (pillars), each of which is coordinated by at least two States and/or Regions 
which within their governance structures assign to an already existing body or to an ad hoc one the 
function of monitoring, facilitating and harmonizing the action of all the players in the strategy. The 
general objectives are linked to the general objectives (priority areas or policy areas), the 
implementation of which contributes to the implementation of the strategy as a whole. The priority 
sectors are the internal joints of the pillars to which flagship projects must refer. For example, in the 
existing strategies, for the pillar related to the links in the macro-region the two priority sectors are 
essentially about transport and energy, for the pillar on environmental protection the biodiversity, the 
reduction of pollutants, sustainability, while for the pillar on sustainable economic growth, the main 
areas are support for innovation, research, businesses and employment. Furthermore, some strategies 
also identify horizontal actions, ie transversal policies which, due to their importance, must always be 
taken into account in the implementation of the pillars, priority areas for intervention and flagship 
projects. Think of the value of spatial planning in a semi-enclosed, relatively small and very busy sea 
like the Baltic. Or, with reference to the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, consideration should be given 
to the centrality of capacity-building and research and innovation to stimulate the growth of skilled 
jobs and competitiveness in an area where strong imbalances in the labor market persist.  
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for the variations that will be better explained in the next paragraph, all the 
strategies are based on multilevel governance distributed on three levels: (a) the 
political level, composed of the EC, the States and a High Level Group, which 
have the task of include the strategy in relevant policy initiatives, promote dialogue 
among stakeholders and contribute to the review and update of the action plan; (b) 
the level of coordination, which according to the strategies is made up of the 
coordinators of the priority areas of intervention and the coordinators of the 
horizontal actions (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), by a 
Governing Board of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 
national coordinators in partnership with the European Commission and very light 
bodies set up ad hoc and hosted in Brussels by already existing government bodies) 
this is the case of the Danube Strategy Point developed by the EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region (EUSDR) or by an Executive Board together with the EU Strategy 
for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) national coordinators; (c) finally the operational 
level, characterized by the presence of Thematic Steering Groups EU Strategy for 
the Adriatic Ionian Region (EUSAIR), leader of the flagship projects and the 
managing authorities for funding instruments and programs (EUSBSR), the Action 
Groups (EUSALP) or the sector coordinators priority intervention (EUSDR). 
Multilevel governance of strategies may seem fairly straightforward, with a clear 
division of labor and skills, in reality the EC, at the precise request of the Council1, 
intervened to clarify which points should be treated with more attention by the 
different actors involved in the strategies2. First of all, the EC highlighted a dual 
need: on the one hand, the strengthening of political leadership and decision-
making in the States and Regions involved, and on the other hand the increase in 
transparency in the organization of work3. He also highlighted the dimensions to be 
improved to refine the governance of the strategies and make sure that all the 
parties work in synergy to achieve the objectives. The first dimension concerns the 
political leadership and ownership, that is the identification of the subject (or 
subjects) guarantor of the strategic direction. From the point of view of political 
                                                   
1 Conclusions of the Council of General Affairs of 22 October 2013, 11729/13. 
2 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the governance of macro-regional strategies, 
COM (2014) 284 final, Brussels, 20.5.2014. 
3 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the governance of macro-regional strategies, 
op. cit. 
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leadership, the EC has called for greater commitment by the States and the regions 
involved in the process. On the side of ownership, on the other hand, no more 
intervention by interested parties, starting with national parliaments, regional 
governments and civil society, can no longer be postponed. To improve the 
situation and remedy these shortcomings, the EC has indicated a series of measures 
to be taken as soon as possible, such as the establishment of a rotating presidency 
of the strategy, the appointment of a special representative, a greater presence 
competent sectoral ministries, better communication of results and activity, etc. 
Another dimension to be improved in the governance of strategies is the link 
between political leadership and implementation. Given that so far has been 
substantially neglected, it must begin to be treated with professional criteria, both 
at national and macro-regional level. For this, an example, the EC report urged the 
contact points placed within the ministries to play a leading role in coordination 
and operational leadership, first of all starting to hold regular meetings. The third 
and last aspect to be completed concerns the implementation of the strategies. To 
this end, it is necessary to facilitate the development and implementation of 
initiatives and projects, to define indicators and objectives, to strengthen 
connections with the corresponding European funding programs (both structural 
funds and directly managed funds) and to improve their alignment with the 
objectives of strategies. Furthermore, synergies should be sought and established 
with the EU's external instruments, in particular the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
(IPA) and the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI)1. To have a successful 
implementation of the strategy it is important that sectoral ministers are fully 
responsible for the work done in the thematic areas, the thematic experts and 
steering groups guide the daily implementation of the strategy, third countries are 
truly integrated, existing institutions cooperate with loyalty and commitment and 
transnational cooperation programs are exploited effectively. 
The common features of the macro-regional strategies are: (a) an inclusive process 
of consultation with stakeholders; (b) the development of new policy principles; (c) 
a flexible and result-oriented membership; (d) the clear definition of 
responsibilities and the division of labor between the parties2; (e) political 
                                                   
1 For details see: Invalid source specified.. 
2 It has not been possible to analyze all the programs since 2009 as some of them, which could have 
some interest from the point of view of the topic in question, are not available online. However, the 
programs analyzed refer to a group of Member States sufficiently representative to make the 
phenomenon’s dimension understand. In this regard we see v. Program of the Lithuanian Presidency 
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experimentation (the annual forum of the members of the strategies, the annual 
report of the Commissiom on the basis of the coordinators’ reports, etc.); (f) 
coordinated policy interventions at the territorial level, taking into account the fact 
that the success of a strategy is largely due to better coordination, efficient and 
effective use of available resources and a strategic use of EU funding (Mirwaldt, 
Mcmaster, & Bachtler, 2010, p. 9 ss). 
 
6. The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) 
The EUSBSR was the first macro-regional strategy launched by the EU and, unlike 
all others that will follow it, is an “internal” strategy of the Union, as it is only part 
of EU Member States, namely Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Sweden1. The challenges were: creating a sustainable 
environment, improving the prosperity of the region, improving accessibility and 
attractiveness, and ultimately ensuring safety, while opportunities stemmed from a 
workforce with a high level of education, from high skills in the field of innovation 
and research, from a vast and relatively uncontaminated territory, rich in natural 
resources and a long and consolidated tradition of interregional cooperation and, 
                                                                                                                                 
of the Council of the European Union (1st July-31st December 2013), For a Credible, Growing and 
Open Europe, p. 9; Program of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Europe, 
a new beginning, 1 July-31 December 2014, p. 19; Program of the Latvian Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union, 1 January-30 June 2015, p. 7; Program of the Slovak Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, 1 July-31 December 2016, p. 13. 
1 The public consultation process initiated and stimulated by the Commission took place between 
August 2008 and February 2009. During this time there were more than one hundred interventions in 
the form of position papers, opinions presented following two stakeholder conferences (Stockholm 
August 2008 and Rostock February 2009), four round tables in Kaunas, Gdansk, Copenhagen and 
Helsinki, a youth conference held in Hamburg and an online consultation forum opened in November 
and December 2008. Report of the European Parliament on a Northern Dimension Strategy focused 
on the Baltic Sea area (2006/2171 (INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Alexander 
Stubb, 10.18.2006 (A6-0367 / 2006), point 2. Regarding other aspects related to the first steps of the 
strategy and especially to its founding path. See for details: R. BENGTSSON, An EU strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region: Good intentions meet complex challenges, Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (SIEPS), European Policy Analysis, 9/2009. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 final. 
Point 59 of its conclusions stated: “Without prejudice to the integrated maritime policy, the European 
Council invites the Commission to present by June 2009 an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region 
which should, inter alia, help to address the urgent environmental challenges associated with the 
Baltic Sea. The Northern Dimension framework provides the basis for the external aspects of 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region (...)". 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol. 11, no. 2/2018 
   22 
finally, from the advantage of being a totally “internal” strategy to the Union. An 
impelling challenge for the Baltic region is undoubtedly that of creating a 
sustainable environment, given the critical conditions of the sea, aggravated by its 
semi-closed nature: difficult and slow change of water, eutrophication due in 
particular to the introduction in the water of nutrients (nitrates and phosphates) 
coming mainly from agriculture, water pollution caused by the practice harmful to 
throw in the sea the ballast water of the ships, fishing at massive levels that has 
depleted fish stocks, etc. Based on the above challenges and opportunities, the EC 
has structured the strategy around four pillars: environmental sustainability; 
prosperity; accessibility and attractiveness; security and protection. There were 
fifteen priority areas of intervention identified “which represent the main areas 
where the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region can contribute to improvements”1, 
each coordinated by one or more States, Regions or other entities participating in 
the EUSBSR. Furthermore, ten horizontal actions were indicated. In 2012, the 
strategy was changed2 and the number of pillars reduced to three, namely sea 
protection, connections in the region and increased prosperity. Furthermore, for 
each objective, indicators and intermediate objectives have been envisaged, which 
were then implemented and concretely declined in the subsequent action plans3. In 
particular, the 2013 action plan marked a turning point, which, by gathering the 
indications from the previous year's review, consolidated the new three-pillar 
structure, for each of them identified sub-objectives, has determined new priority 
areas of intervention (which are increased to seventeen) and has halved the number 
of horizontal actions to five. If the 2013 action plan profoundly revised the Baltic 
macro-regional strategy, bearing in mind the lessons learned from the mistakes 
made previously, in 2015 the parties to EUSBSR adopted a new action plan which 
is currently in force4. The coordination of the horizontal actions is entrusted to an 
audience of very different subjects demonstrating the particular form of multilevel 
governance on which EUSBSR is founded, but in general a European macro-
                                                   
1 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Action 
Plan, SEC(2009) 712, 10.6.2009, p. 3. 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Union Strategy 
for the Baltic Sea Region, COM(2012) 128 final del 23.3.2012. 
3 For the list and explanation of the various indicators and intermediate objectives see COM(2012) 
128 finale, pp. 7-12. 
4 Commission Staff Working Document, European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Action 
Plan 2015, SWD(2015) 177 final, 10.9.2015. 
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regional strategy. Specifically, capacity building is coordinated by the network of 
NGOs active in the Baltic area, the Union of the Baltic Cities1 and the Swedish 
Institute2, the response to climate change by the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
Secretariat, cooperation with the countries and neighborhood regions from the 
Finnish city of Turku and the Council. 
 
7. (Follows) The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region 
(EUSDR). 
The EUSDR, largely influenced by the experience of the Baltic Sea Region and 
was launched by the EC in December 2010 and accompanied by a specific action 
plan, both approved by the Council on 13 April 20113. Previously other bodies and 
institutions of the Union intervened to solicit the intervention of EC4. The 
European Council of 18-19 June 2009 had invited her to submit an EU strategy for 
the Danube region by the end of 20105, the Committee of the Regions had issued 
an opinion at the end of 2009 and the EP in January 2010 had urged the 
Commission “to launch, as soon as possible, extensive consultations with all 
countries wetted by the Danube, in order to cover the various aspects of regional 
                                                   
1 The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is a global political forum for regional 
intergovernmental cooperation founded in 1992 by the Foreign Ministers of the States of the region as 
a response to geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War. The CBSS identifies policy 
objectives, creates action plans, launches projects, acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas on issues 
of regional interest and is responsible for the overall coordination of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat 
and finally spatial planning and development. a common approach to cross-border cooperation from 
VASAB and HELCOM, two decades-long cooperation tools in these fields. 
2 R. Bengtsson, An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Complex 
Challenges, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), European Policy Analysis, 
9/2009. 
3 The member States are fourteen, nine EU Member States namely Germany, Austria, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, three accession candidate 
countries, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, and two Neighborhood countries, Ukraine 
and Moldova. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region, Brussels, 8.12.2010, COM (2010) 715 final. 
4 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, 
Bruxelles, 8.4.2013, COM(2013) 181 final. 
5 Commission Staff Working Document Action Plan, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European Union Strategy for the 
Danube Region, Brussels 8.12.2010, SEC(2010) 1489. 
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cooperation and to present the EU Strategy for the Danube Region at the latest by 
the end of 2010”1. 
The EUSDR is characterized by a series of challenges relating to the issues of 
mobility, energy, the environment, risks of natural or man-made disasters, strong 
socio-economic disparities, security and transnational organized crime. The 
governance of EUSDR, while presenting some specificities, essentially follows the 
model of the macro-regional Baltic strategy and is therefore organized in three 
different levels: the level of coordination, made up of the national coordinators, the 
EC and the Danube Transnational Program (DSP); the political level, in which the 
States Parties to the Strategy are present at ministerial level and in which the EC 
also plays a role; the operational level, characterized by the coordinators of the 
eleven priority areas of intervention previously exposed, connected to the pillars 
and with a role also assigned to the SDR. Not disregarding what has been done and 
what has been achieved, the EC, however, specifies that the strategy aims to 
improve the results achieved and to increase the impact by aligning the existing 
funds and policies at European, national and regional levels, making the most of 
mistakes and of the lessons learned2. 
The latter relate to the areas concerned to the implementation of the strategy, to 
political support, to the financing of concrete actions, to the strengthening of 
existing initiatives, to the orientation of results and objectives, to the integration of 
policies and funds, to the integration of third countries and to communication. 
Finally, the EC lists a series of recommendations that the States and the parts of the 
EUSDR should follow, such as, to name the most significant, the creation of 
sustainable leadership and strategic planning for EUSDR, the constant monitoring 
of the implementation of all priority areas for action, ensuring greater results 
orientation taking into account both the objectives to be pursued and the 
quantitative indicators, both the roadmaps, the systematic integration of EUSDR 
into the EU national and regional programs for the period 2014-2020, both with 
                                                   
1 Council conclusions on the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, 3083rd GENERAL 
AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels 13.4.2011, which the Council: “(...) endorses the EU Strategy 
for the Danube Region and takes note of the annexed Action Plan that was elaborated by the 
Commission on the basis of a consultation with the Member States, third countries and other 
stakeholders (...)” (par. 11).  
2 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, 
Bruxelles, op. cit. 
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reference to the Structural and Investment Funds and directly managed funds; the 
increase in communication activities to reach an even wider audience1. 
 
7. (Follows) The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) 
The third EU strategy, which builds on pre-existing cooperation frameworks such 
as the Adriatic-Ionian Euroregion2, the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and 
Ionian seas and the Adriatic Ionian Initiative (IAI)3, was the EUSAIR presented by 
the EC in June 2014 (together with the Action Plan)4 on input from the December 
2012 European Council and born “following the tragedy of the former 
Yugoslavia”579. Subsequently, both the Council (29 September 2014)680 and the 
                                                   
1 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, op. 
cit. 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Maritime Strategy for the 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas, Bruxelles, 30.11.2012, COM(2012) 713 final. 
3 The IAI was established in Ancona on 19-20 May 2000 at the summit for development and security 
on the Adriatic and Ionian seas, attended by the Heads of State and Government of Italy, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia. At the end of the conference, the Foreign 
Ministers of the participating countries signed the Ancona Declaration, in the presence of the 
President of the European Commission on regional cooperation as an instrument to promote 
economic and political stability and the process of European integration. The six original members 
were joined by the Union of Serbia-Montenegro in 2002 and, following the demerger, in 2006, both 
Serbia and Montenegro maintained membership in the initiative, thus constituted by eight countries: 
Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. The IAI 
operates mainly on four themes: small and medium-sized businesses; transport and maritime 
cooperation; tourism, culture and inter-university cooperation (eg: Uni Adrion University Network, 
established on December 15th 2000 following the Ravenna Declaration); environment and fire 
protection. It should be noted that the Ionian Adriatic Council of the IIA with a declaration of 5 May 
2010 had taken a pioneering position by formalizing its support for the EU strategy for the Adriatic-
Ionian region and declaring itself available to “play an active role, engage public and private sectors”. 
and encourage stakeholders, especially regional authorities, companies, universities and civil society 
for the successful preparation of a future EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region”. IAI continues 
to play a significant role within EUSAIR. 
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy for the 
Adriatic and Ionian Region, Bruxelles, 17.6.2014, COM(2014) 357 final. 
5 European Council 13-14.12.2012 Conclusions, EUCO 205/12. 
6 Commission Staff Working Document, Action Plan accompanying the document Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the 
Adriatic and Ionian Region, Brussels, 17.6.2014, SWD(2014) 190 final. 
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European Council (24 October 2014)1 approved the strategy, guaranteeing their 
commitment in carrying it forward as far as their responsibility is concerned. 
Before the official launch of EUSAIR, the Adriatic and Ionian Interregional Group 
of the Committee of the Regions also intervened with its own contribution during 
the consultation with the stakeholders (13 December 2013), the European 
Economic and Social Committee with an exploratory opinion on the document 
consultation (21 January 2014)2 and the European Investment Bank (6-7 February 
2014)3. 
The reasons behind the establishment of EUSAIR have been many, starting from 
the geographical element (the sea as a unifying factor), from the geopolitical 
evolution (dissolution of the former Yugoslavia) and from the attempt to extend the 
standards of the European Union to third parties and candidates for accession4. On 
the Union action side, however, not unlike what has been done for other macro-
regional strategies, the EC’s proposals for the establishment of EUSAIR start from 
the identification of the common challenges and opportunities that the area 
presents. With regards to the challenges, these are largely connected to the strong 
socio-economic disparities that characterize the area and which create a 
heterogeneous and unbalanced environment among the countries concerned. There 
are also several sectoral domains to be taken into account to understand the 
usefulness of EUSAIR and the difficulties it finds and will face. Just think about 
                                                   
1 Council conclusions on the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 
General Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 29 September 2014. 
2 European Council Conclusions (23 and 24 October 2014), EUCO 169/14. 
3 The Committee provided a substantially positive assessment of the strategy and the manner in which 
it was being prepared, but it also did not spare critical opinions, which were also physiological and 
constructive in this preparatory phase. For example, he stressed that the consultation document made 
no mention of the strategic value of Mediterranean cooperation, noted the total absence of the private 
sector from the consultation document, stressed that the strategy should have shown a stronger social 
characterization, so to better support inclusive growth in the region concerned, regretted that the 
consultation paper did not deal adequately with issues concerning irregular and illegal migration 
flows. 
4 The EIB has recalled the efforts it has made over the years that have enabled investment in strategic 
sectors of several billions of euros to be activated. Just to give an example: in the period 2010-2013, it 
granted loans to the countries involved in the strategy for an amount of more than EUR 45 billion. 
The loans were also used to support the Italian ports included in the TEN-T network in their 
modernization and expansion process, such as the port of Ravenna. Or, as regards Slovenia, it should 
be noted the investments made for the port of Koper and the construction of transmission networks 
for energy and gas which had a clear relevance for the Western Balkans. Or the first EUR 80 million 
loan for the Zagreb airport (Croatia), the investment support made by FIAT in Kragujevac (Serbia) 
for a total of about half a billion euros and a first tranche of EUR 350 million to the Greece for the 
relaunch of four stalled motorway concessions included in the TEN-T networks. 
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the lack of transport infrastructure and in particular the shortcomings affecting road 
and rail connections between and in the countries involved. Or to the congestion of 
the maritime traffic in two relatively small seas, one of which, the Adriatic, marked 
by its semi-enclosed sea nature. Other challenges are related to the low level of 
development of multimodal transport, to the weaknesses in the energy sector due to 
the inadequacy of the electricity grids and the consequent impossibility of 
developing an integrated energy market, including as regards renewable energy 
sources. On the environmental level, the situation is certainly not much more rosy 
given that there is a clear need to intervene to safeguard ecosystems, to move 
towards forms of sustainable tourism, to undertake a serious and integrated fight 
against marine pollution, to increase the sustainability of fisheries and aquaculture. 
Other problems are the treatment of wastewater and discharges of agricultural 
activities, the reduction of emissions that damage air quality, the fight against 
illegal hunting, the completion of protected areas such as NATURA 2000 and 
Emerald1, networks, the strategies aimed at to face risks such as sea rise, floods, 
drought, soil erosion, forest fires. Particularly pernicious to achieve the objectives 
of the strategy are revealed the institutional and administrative limits that are 
substantiated in the presence of phenomena such as corruption, organized cross-
border crime and migratory pressures that in certain situations have proved to be 
unmanageable. 
The EC focuses on four aspects, namely the blue economy, connectivity, cultural 
and natural heritage and biodiversity, and finally tourism. These four potential 
strengths are the four pillars of EUSAIR around which the action plan is structured: 
on blue growth; on connections in the region; on environmental quality; on 
sustainable tourism. Each of the indicated pillars is entrusted to the coordination of 
two countries involved in the strategy. The blue growth pillar, entrusted to the 
coordination of Greece and Montenegro, aims to promote innovative marine and 
maritime growth in the region through the development of blue technologies, 
increasing the profitability and sustainability of fisheries and aquaculture, 
improving the governance and marine and maritime services. Italy and Serbia 
coordinate the pillar on links in the region whose objective is to improve 
connectivity in transport and energy within the region and with the rest of Europe 
by implementing cooperation in the fields of maritime transport, intermodal 
                                                   
1 Council conclusions on the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 
General Affairs Council meeting, op. cit. 
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connections with the hinterland and the electricity and gas networks. The 
environmental quality pillar, coordinated by Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
aims to contribute to improving the environmental conditions of marine and coastal 
ecosystems by reducing marine pollution, reducing soil sealing, reducing pollution 
of the air and halting the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystems. 
The pillar on sustainable tourism, managed by Croatia and Albania, aims to 
develop the region’s potential for innovative, sustainable, responsible and quality 
tourism, in particular through the diversification of tourism products and services 
and the overcoming of the phenomenon of seasonality. As has been opportunely 
highlighted, however, the objectives of EUSAIR are consistent with the call for 
cooperation and coordination contained in art. 123 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and addressed to coastal States of 
closed or semi-enclosed seas (Tanaka, 2012, p. 248ss). 
The governance of EUSAIR is of particular interest as it is aligned with the most 
recent reflections on the theme.1 EC, looking at the experiences made, identifies 
three main needs: the strengthening of political leadership; an effective decision-
making process; a good organization. The architecture of EUSAIR's governance is 
also divided into three levels. The political one does not present substantial 
differences compared to that indicated on the general plan. As regards the level of 
coordination, a Governing Board was co-chaired by the country that presides pro-
tempore the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative and the EC. They are part of it: two national 
coordinators for each country; the coordinators of the four thematic pillars; the 
members of the Commission DGs concerned; a representative of the EP; a 
representative of the Committee of the Regions; a representative of the European 
Economic and Social Committee; the Permanent Secretariat of the Adriatic-Ionian 
Initiative; a representative of the Managing Authority of ADRION and the 
EUSAIR Facility Point. The Governing Board acts as a strategic guide to the 
direction and implementation of the strategy and its action plan. Again with regard 
to the level of coordination, the four Thematic Steering Groups should be noted, 
which are chaired for a period of three years, on a rotating basis, by countries that 
have the responsibility for coordinating the individual thematic pillars. Finally, the 
operational level focuses essentially on the ADRION program which supports the 
governance and implementation of the strategy. 
                                                   
1 The reference is clearly in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
governance of macro-regional strategies, Bruxelles, 20.5.2014, COM(2014) 284 final. 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
29 
 
EUSAIR held its first annual forum in 2016 with the participation of relevant 
ministers from all Member States, regional and local authorities and many 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of the strategy. The forum, organized 
by the Government of Croatia and the EC, was held on 12-13 May 2016 in 
Dubrovnik with the adoption of a document in twenty-one points that did not hide 
the difficulties of the process under construction but also indicated a series of new 
tasks for the future. The device can be divided into four macro-topics: crisis of 
refugees and migrants; future commitments to react to current gaps; integration of 
the Western Balkan countries into the EU; role and involvement of stakeholders. 
Regarding the issue of refugees, the Declaration recalled the principle of solidarity 
that should move the Union, expressed its deep concern about the refugee and 
migrant crisis, invited the Governing Board of EUSAIR to outline concrete paths 
of action to the support that EUSAIR can provide to the countries parties to the 
strategy (especially to Italy and Greece) and finally encouraged all national and 
regional programs and forms of cooperation financed by the EU, as well as pre-
accession assistance programs (IPA), to consider how they can be addressed in 
coping with these humanitarian crises, also through a possible rebalancing of the 
resources assigned to them. With regard to future commitments, they will have to 
deal quickly and effectively with the problems posed by some implementation 
vacuums, and therefore: (a) the representatives of the administrations of the 
countries parties to the Governing Board and the thematic Steering Groups will 
have an adequate power to make decisions; (b) financial, administrative and 
technical resources should be made available to the respective national or regional 
administrations to the pillar coordinators and members of the thematic steering 
groups to ensure that they can effectively fulfill their functions; (c) sub-state levels 
of government will need to be involved in the implementation of EUSAIR to 
reflect the multi-level governance approach. With reference to the integration 
process of the Western Balkan countries in the EU, the document recognizes that 
several processes, organizations and initiatives have the ultimate goal of 
accelerating the integration in the Union of the Balkan countries currently excluded 
and that are potential candidates or for accession candidates1. In this framework the 
device underlines the importance of the so-called “Berlin Process”, ie the 
                                                   
1 The reference is clearly in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
governance of macro-regional strategies, op. cit. 
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Conference of Western Balkan States held for the first time in the German capital 
on 28 August 2014 which was attended by all the non-EU countries of EUSAIR, 
then Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, plus Kosovo and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as Slovenia, Croatia, Germany, 
Austria and representatives of the Union. The main purpose of this high-level 
dialogue is particularly ambitious and concerns the very future of the enlargement 
of the Union and the related processes of integration of the Balkan countries not yet 
members. In this regard, the process aims to take stock of the situation on the small 
progress of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
to provide an additional political framework for the development of cooperation in 
the field of economic investments and infrastructure in South-Eastern Europe and 
to evaluate the state of Serbia's relations with Russia in the light of international 
sanctions decided in 2014 following the crisis in Ukraine. Finally, with regard to 
the role and involvement of all actors in the strategy, the Dubrovnik Declaration 
calls on the governance structures of EUSAIR to take into account all the activities 
undertaken by the participating countries to identify projects of common interest 
that will improve regional cooperation in general and, in particular, regional 
interconnectivity, the link between young people, the advancement of economic 
development and the strengthening of participation of the civil society. 
The second forum was held on 11-12 May 2017 in Ioannina (Greece), organized 
jointly by the EC and the Greek government with the support of the Strategy 
Facility Point. With the final declaration1, the States Parties of EUSAIR stressed 
their willingness to maintain a strong political commitment and thus increase the 
sense of ownership of the ministers involved, while strengthening the 
empowerment of key strategy actuators, ie the national coordinators and the four 
pillars and members of the thematic steering groups. The document then reviewed 
each single pillar and instructed all the countries involved to enhance mutual 
cooperation to support sustainable economic growth and job creation in the marine 
and maritime sectors, to reduce the risk of accidents at sea, pollution deriving from 
the activities of ships and loss of life in the area, to improve the status of ports and 
intermodality and to increase transport interconnections, for example by 
completing the Trieste-Patras sea highway. Lastly, the passage in which the need to 
examine ways of including macro-regional strategies in EU policies in the post-
2020 programming period is also significant. 
                                                   
1 Ioannina Declaration, 11 May 2017, Adriatic and Ionian Council/EUSAIR Ministerial Meeting, 2rd 
Forum of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region. 
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The third forum took place in Catania on 24-25 May 2018 and represented the final 
stage of the Italian presidency of EUSAIR and of the Adriatic-Ionian initiative 
which lasted from 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. In the preamble of the final 
declaration,1 the role played by EUSAIR in the progressive strengthening of 
regional cooperation is recognized and it is noted that the system of multi-level 
governance of the strategy, actions and projects structured according to the four 
pillars “are having a positive impact on the process of EU integration of the 
Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries in the Adriatic and Ionian Region”2. 
The declaration endorses the request made by the government of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become the ninth party of the Adriatic-Ionian 
Initiative, inviting the Council of the European Union and the Commission to take 
all necessary steps to include the country in EUSAIR. This move, moreover, is part 
of the initiative implemented by Skopije to speed up the process of joining the EU, 
together with the conclusion of the dispute with Greece concerning the name of the 
Macedonian State, officially renamed the Republic of Northern Macedonia.3 In 
essence, the EUSAIR's role in promoting the EU's enlargement policy to the 
Western Balkans, as already noted by the EP in January 2018,4 is even more 
important after the strategic document on the Western Balkans presented by the EC 
in February 20185 and the Final Declaration adopted at the Western EU-Balkans 
summit held in Sofia (Bulgaria) in May 20186. Finally, the declaration recalls the 
                                                   
1 Catania Declaration, 24 May 2018, Adriatic and Ionian Council/EUSAIR Ministerial Meeting, 3rd 
Forum of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region. 
2 Catania Declaration, 24 May 2018, Adriatic and Ionian Council/EUSAIR Ministerial Meeting, 3rd 
Forum of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region. 
3 Agreement signed on 17 June 2018 by the foreign ministers of the two countries. 
4 Resolution of the European Parliament of 16 January 2018 on the implementation of EU macro-
regional strategies (2017/2040 (INI)), which, at paragraph 18, asserts that "this model of cooperation 
can be a great opportunity for the whole region; (...) EUSAIR could give a boost to enlargement and 
the process of integration (...)”. 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A credible enlargement 
perspective and a greater EU commitment to the Western Balkans (COM (2018) 65 final), Strasbourg, 
06/02/2018. The document clearly suggests that only Serbia and Montenegro could complete their 
accession to the EU by 2025, but on condition that they demonstrate a strong political will, realize 
real and structural reforms and reach definitive solutions for disputes with neighboring countries (p. 
18). 
6 Sofia Declaration, EU-Western Balkans Summit, 17 May 2018. The Sofia Priorities Program 
identifies six macro-areas to support in order to facilitate convergence in the Balkan region and to 
facilitate the accession path to the Union of the countries involved. These macro-areas are: support for 
the rule of law and good governance; the commitment to security and migration; support for socio-
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need to provide for the establishment of a multi-annual financial framework 2021-
2027 a territorial cooperation program with adequate and balanced financial 
resources that has the same geographical coverage as EUSAIR and is in line with 
it. 
 
8. (Follows) The European Union Strategy for the Alpine Region 
(EUSALP) 
The EUSALP, officially launched by the EC in July 20151 with the related Action 
Plan2 and was approved by the Council in the meeting of 27 November 2015, thus 
giving effect to the conclusions of the European Council of 19 and 20 December 
2013.3 Supranational recognition comes later decades of effective cooperation 
between the actors involved and after several stages that have better defined the 
outlines, such as the Bad Ragaz Decision (29 June 2012), the resolution of the EP 
of May 2013 on the macro-regional strategy for the Alps,4 the political resolution 
towards a European Union strategy for the Alpine region (Grenoble, October 
2013), the results of the public consultation (October 2014), the Milan Declaration 
of Representatives of the States and Regions (December 2014) and the 2014 
opinions of the Committee of the Regions5 of the European Economic and Social 
                                                                                                                                 
economic development processes, with particular attention to young people; the enhancement of 
connectivity; the digital agenda for the Western Balkans; support for reconciliation efforts and good 
neighborly relations in the region. 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning a European Union 
Strategy for the Alpine Region, Brussels, 28.7.2015, COM(2015) 366 final. 
2 Commission Staff Working Document, Action Plan accompanying the document Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Alpine 
Region, Brussels, 28.7.2015, SWD(2015) 147 final. 
3 Conclusions of the European Council of 19-20.12.2013, EUCO 217/13 
4 European Parliament resolution of 23 May 2013 on a macro-regional strategy for the Alps, P7_TA 
(2013) 0229, in which, among other things, the positive role played by EU legislative instruments 
such as EGTCs in relation to macro-regions is underlined because provide structural support for the 
implementation of the more concrete aspects of cooperation and exchange of good practices, as well 
as for the development and implementation of territorial development strategies to facilitate the 
cooperation of authorities located at different levels (par. 3). 
5 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on an Alpine macro-regional strategy for the European 
Union, Rapporteur: Herwig Van Staa (AT/EPP), President of the Parliament of the Land of Tyrol, 
presented at the 109th plenary session of 3 and 4 December 2014. 
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Committee.1 These intermediate stages of rapprochement were possible thanks to 
some already existing cooperation tools, such as the Alpine Convention and Alpine 
Space.2  
EUSALP is structured around three pillars: (a) economic growth and innovation, 
which aims to achieve equal access to job opportunities and to make the macro-
region highly competitive; (b) mobility and connectivity, that is to guarantee an 
internal and external accessibility to the sustainable macro-region and careful to 
combine the needs of moving people and goods with the environmental ones; (c) 
environment and energy, aimed at making available to the citizens of the area an 
inclusive environmental context and renewable and reliable energy solutions. The 
governance of EUSALP, therefore, is entrusted to various subjects and ad hoc 
bodies. The decision-making process and the general political direction is a 
prerogative of the General Assembly, composed of high-level representatives of 
the States and the regions involved, the European Commission and the Alpine 
Convention as an observer member. The Assembly, among other things, organizes 
the annual forum of the parties and makes decisions by consensus, while the 
internal Commission acts as a facilitator and coordinator and is co-chair of the 
body without voting rights. The parties to EUSALP intended to provide a central 
role in the coordination of the various levels of the strategy as, as explained in the 
action plan, “(...) the governance of a macro-regional strategy requires greater 
dialogue and substantial coordination across all decision-making levels, and sectors 
inside each state and region as well as between participating States and Regions”. 3 
This is why on the one hand the national co-ordinators have been foreseen, 
guaranteeing the leveling of the individual States parties, and on the other the 
coordinators of the general objectives of EUSALP, acting at macro-regional level 
and representing only the interest of the macro-region. In addition, an Executive 
Board was formed consisting of representatives of the States and Regions and the 
                                                   
1 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on An EU Strategy for the Alpine Region 
(exploratory opinion), Rapporteur: Palmieri, Brussels, 10 December 2014, ECO/368. 
2 The second edition, Interreg IVB from 2007 to 2013, and the third, Interreg VB was launched in 
2014 and is currently underway. As for the partners of the program, Italy, France and Germany 
participate with the regions of the Alpine arc, while Austria, Slovenia, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
adhere in their entirety. Four priorities have been identified: i) to improve the opportunities and 
conditions for increasing innovation, ii) to promote the transition to a community and a low carbon 
area, iii) to protect and enhance the natural and cultural heritage of the region , iv) increase and refine 
the application of multilevel and transnational governance in the Alpine area. 
3 SWD(2015) 147 final, p. 49. 
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Alpine Convention and Alpine Space as observers and in charge of overseeing the 
implementation of the strategy action plan.1 Finally, Action Group Leaders have 
been identified, experts in the sector who will be called to ensure the effective 
implementation of projects and actions in the various priority areas of intervention 
linked to the three pillars.2 
 
9. The Question of (Multi-Level) Governance as a Fundamental Aspect 
for the Effective and Efficient Functioning of Macro-Regional 
Strategies 
In December 2016 the EC outlined an initial assessment of the experience of this 
instrument of territorial cooperation.3 The most recent strategies show some 
difficulties, certainly due to the physiological start-up problems, so they still need 
time to be reliably evaluated. With reference to governance, it is clear that it is a 
central point for the proper functioning of regional strategies and for the relative 
achievement of their objectives. It is equally peaceful, moreover, that the paradigm 
that best fits the macro-regional strategies is that of multi-level governance. Since 
many actors are involved, it is very important to establish clearly how the work 
should be organized and how responsibility for the tasks to be implemented should 
be shared. The governance of the strategies, in reality, also highlights another fact, 
namely the existence of a multilevel governance system that both internally and 
externally identifies the strategies. In other words, under the first profile the 
intervention of the regional and local authorities is very important both in the 
“ascending phase”4 of defining the strategy and in the “descending phase”5 of 
                                                   
1 Its decisions, if any, are passed to the scrutiny of the European Commission, which must ensure 
their compliance with EU legislation. Other important tasks of the Board are to be the body 
responsible for the overall horizontal and vertical coordination of the strategy and to prepare the 
meetings of the General Assembly. 
2 In addition to following the implementation process of the flagship projects, they will have to 
constantly take care of the transnational approach, in order to avoid fragmentation and ensure that the 
actions taken by the project participants are coherent and do not lose sight of the important objective 
of territorial cohesion. 
3 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of EU macro-regional 
strategies, Brussels, 16.12.2016, COM (2016) 805 final. 
4 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU-
27 towards 2025, COM (2017) 2025, 1 March 2017. 
5 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU-
27 towards 2025, op. cit. 
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concrete implementation of the same; on the other hand, under the second profile, 
the macro-region that is created could be a further layer of the already stratified EU 
structure. From this last point of view there are many doubts about the correctness 
of this approach, but it is not wise to think that if these instruments of territorial 
cooperation should continue to proliferate, to become structural in the Union's 
territorial cohesion policy and to better define their political autonomy (from the 
point of view of legal personality, for example), then they could really become 
further levels of government involved in defining the rules and policies of the 
Union. A fortiori in the fluid phase in which the EU stands out, among other things, 
by a reflection on its future that leaves open the possibility to a scenario focused on 
enhanced cooperation, ie on that "multi-speed Europe" that for many it is a 
hypothesis to be discarded (primarily for the EC), for others it is a means to save 
the European project by taking note of the current situation109.1  
In recent years the EC has insisted a lot on the question of the governance of 
strategies, aware of the fact that a good part of their success depends precisely on 
it. For this reason, in 2014 he presented a report expressly dedicated to 
governance.2 If the report on the governance of macro-regional strategies has 
already been said, it is interesting to examine what has recently been established by 
the European institutions on this important aspect. For this reason, first of all, he 
notes the EC report on the implementation of the strategies presented in December 
2016 that returns to the topic, once again underlining the indispensability of 
effective and efficient governance for a correct implementation of the strategies.3 
The document, in fact, underlines that the strategies bring a significant added value 
to the cohesion policy because they “offer a platform for multi-sector, 
multinational and multilevel governance, also open to third countries” and that for 
                                                   
1 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU-
27 towards 2025, op. cit. 
2 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of EU macro-regional 
strategies, op. cit. The report is accompanied by a working document prepared by the Commission 
which goes into every single strategy detail. Yes v. Commission Staff Working Document 
Documentation from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Committee on the 
implementation of the EU macro-regional strategies (SWD (2016) 443 final). The Commission has 
decided that from now on it will present an evaluation report for each of the four strategies every two 
years. The next is therefore scheduled for December 2018. 
3 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the governance of macro-regional strategies, 
Brussels, 20.5.2014, COM (2014) 284 final. 
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good governance it is first and foremost indispensable optimize the use of existing 
sources of funding (structural funds and funds managed by the EC), improve the 
implementation of existing legislation and make better use of existing institutions. 
In essence, the EC reiterates and re-launches the so-called “rule of the three no”, 
mentioned above.1 Furthermore, the report highlights the question of ownership of 
strategies and the role of the chairman of the macro-regional strategies, but also 
highlights the persistence of common challenges to all four macro-regional 
strategies, ie the presence or absence of efficient coordination and cooperation 
structures, the granting of powers to the main executives, the effective availability 
of adequate human and financial resources, the representation and commitment of 
all participating countries, the existence of the necessary skills and the continuity 
and stability of the management groups. Finally, the document outlines the 
prospects for the future and in this regard recognizes that, although some results 
have been achieved, much remains to be done in particular in the field of results 
orientation, funding, relations with third countries, part of the strategies and note of 
the effectiveness of governance systems. Under this last profile further efforts are 
needed to make progress through: -the regular evaluation by each strategy of the 
effectiveness of its governance system, in line with the 2014 Commission report on 
governance; (b) a greater commitment by the relevant ministries ratione materiae in 
pursuing the objectives of the macro-regional strategies also through a periodic 
rotation of the coordinators of the thematic areas; (c) close cooperation between the 
members of the steering groups and the program management authorities supported 
by the Structural and Investment Funds and European investment or other 
instruments; (d) strengthening, wherever possible and practicable, links between 
the various macro-regional strategies for exploiting synergies and mutual learning 
with the support of INTERACT.2 
The Ministers of the EU Member States reaffirmed the fact that all four strategies 
are facing individual challenges and problems and that the governance of the 
strategies could be further strengthened to improve their effectiveness and therefore 
invite the partner countries and their Regions to engage in multiple directions to: 
(a) maintain a strong common political commitment with a high sense of 
ownership for the implementation of strategies; (b) increase coordination and 
                                                   
1 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the governance of macro-regional strategies, 
Brussels, 20.5.2014, COM (2014) 284 final. 
2 Council conclusions on the implementation of EU Macro-Regional Strategies, 25 April 2017. 
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cooperation in order to improve the commitment to the effective implementation of 
the strategies; (c) building the necessary administrative capacity to ensure that 
political engagement is translated into effective and concrete implementation; (d) 
enhance key actuators such as national co-ordinators, priority area coordinators or 
Steering Groups members and increase ownership of relevant ministries; (e) 
mobilize regions, cities, agencies, institutions, universities, companies and civil 
society by encouraging them to cooperate, create networks and participate actively 
in the implementation and development of macro-regional strategies. 
 
10. Future EU Macro-Regional Strategies: A Further Development of 
the EU Macro-Regionalization Or Setback? 
Given the moderate success of the macro-regional strategies and the contribution 
they give (and even more could give) to the achievement of the EU objectives, the 
EC intends to continue on this path and launch other strategies. At present it is not 
easy to identify with certainty what strategies could be set up in the future, even if 
the document presented in 2015 by the EP's Directorate General for Internal 
Policies represents a useful and authoritative orientation.1 It illustrates the macro-
regional strategies examined by the EU for their possible future creation and 
concern the regions of the Carpathians, the North Sea, the Black Sea, the Atlantic 
Arc and the western and eastern quadrants of the Mediterranean Sea. As regards 
the EU strategy for the Carpathian region, the countries involved should be 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (EU Member States) and Ukraine (third 
country of the Eastern neighborhood).2 Cooperation between these countries is not 
a year of zero, as there are already multilateral instruments to foster cooperation in 
certain sectors, namely the Framework Convention on the Protection and 
Sustainable Development of the Carpathians (the Carpathian Convention)3 and the 
                                                   
1 AA.VV., New role of macro-regions in European Territorial Cooperation, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, Regional Development, 
January 2015, pp. 73ss. 
2 B. Tescasiu, Toward A Macro-Regional Strategy For The Carpathians, Series V: Economic 
Sciences, Vol. 8 (57) No. 1, 2015. A.-C. Popoviciu (Editor), Cross-Border Cooperation: Models Of 
Good Practice In Carpathian Region, Bucarest, 2014. Z. Gál, S. Rácz, Introduction-The Carpathians: 
A European Macroregion, In Z. Gál, S. Rácz (Eds), Socio-Economic Analysis Of The Carpathian 
Area, Discussion Papers 2008-Special Issue, Pp. 9-20. 
3 Signed in May 2003 and entered into force in January 2006, it is currently the only multilevel 
governance mechanism covering the entire Carpathian area and, together with the Alpine Convention, 
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Euroregion of Carpazi.1 In addition, there are other transnational structures to 
support the constituent strategy: the Eastern Partnership and the European 
Neighborhood Instrument, the Carpathian Region Business Network, the Karpacki 
Horizont 20202 Association and other structured and well-established bilateral or 
multilateral cross-border cooperation schemes.3 As regards the EU strategy for the 
Black Sea region4 its elaboration is made problematic, above all due to conflicts 
and geopolitical instabilities in some countries that should be part of it.5 
However, cooperation in the area is rather long-standing and at European level it 
was sanctioned by the Black Sea Synergy launched by the Commission in 20076, 
which included, among other things, the main areas of cooperation, namely 
                                                                                                                                 
is the only sub-regional treaty in the world to protect and the sustainable development of a mountain 
area. Its organs are the Conference of the Parties, where all the member countries are represented at 
ministerial level (mostly environmental ministers), the subsidiary bodies set up by the Implementation 
Committee of the Convention and the Work Groups organized on a thematic basis, a Secretariat and 
the Carpathian Network of Protected Areas initiative (CNPA). Its general objectives are the 
improvement of the quality of life, the strengthening of local economies and communities and the 
preservation of natural values and cultural heritage (Article 2, paragraph 1) and could prefigure the 
three pillars of the future strategy. 
1 It is an international cross-border association founded on 14 February 1993 by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ukraine and Hungary, to which Romania and Slovakia were subsequently 
added and formed by representatives of regional and local administrations. The Euroregion considers 
the macro-regional strategy as the most ambitious of its outcomes which, in order to be concrete, 
requires first of all effective lobbying and joint representation at European level and then of adequate 
support and funding. 
2 G. Abels; A. Eppler & M. Anegret (Hrsg) Die Eu-Reflexionsgruppe “Horizonte 2020-2030”. 
Herausforderungen Und Reformoptionen Für Das Mehrebenensystem, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
2010. 
3 The Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Program, the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine Program, the 
Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova Program, the Hungary-Romania Program, the Poland-
Slovakia Program and the Hungary-Slovakia Program. 
4 F. Garcés De Los Fayos, The EU’s Black Sea policy: Where do we stand?, Directorate-General for 
External Policies of the Union- Policy Department, European Union, 2013. K. Henderson, C. Weaver 
(edited by), The Black Sea Region and EU policy. The challenge of divergent Agendas, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2010. A. Pop, D. Manoleli, Towards a european strategy in the black sea area: 
The territorial cooperation, in Strategy and Policy Studies (SPOS), No. 2007, pp. 5ss. Z. Ritter, EU 
engagement in the Black Sea Region: Challenges and opportunities for the EU, Working Paper, 
Berlin, 2006. 
 
5 Think of the c.d. “Frozen conflicts” concerning Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova, South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan, until the recent 
Ukrainian case with the referendum on the self-determination of Crimea which joined the Russian 
Federation and the special status transitory of the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and 
Lugansk. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Black Sea 
Synergy-A new regional cooperation initiative, COM (2007) 160 final, 11.04.2007. 
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democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, management of the 
movement of people and goods and improvement of security, "frozen" conflicts, 
energy, transport, environment, maritime policy, fisheries, trade, networks in the 
fields of research and education, science and technology, employment and social 
affairs and finally regional development1 which, highlighting the inadequacy of the 
Synergy, invited “the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to 
elaborate a strategy for the Black Sea region” in order to “strengthen the coherence 
and visibility of the EU action in the region” (Liakopoulos, 2016). 
The EU strategy for the North Sea region, however, unlike the previous one, is a 
strategy almost entirely within the Union, as it involves eight countries of which 
six Member States, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, and two third countries, Norway and the United Kingdom (looking at the 
end of the withdrawal procedure scheduled probably in the spring of 2019). The 
two main priority areas of the possible strategy should be maritime cooperation and 
energy networks, while other key areas indicated by the North Sea Region 2020 
strategy paper are maritime spatial management, increased accessibility and clean 
transport, adaptation and mitigation of climate change, improvement of 
attractiveness and sustainability of communities, promotion of innovation, regional 
excellence and sustainability as a whole. The transnational support structures are 
mainly the North Sea Commission founded in 1989 and the Interreg cooperation 
program. 
Another important step was the opinion adopted by the European Economic and 
Social Committee in May 2012 called EU Strategy for the Atlantic Region2, while 
the following year the EC invited the EP and Council to approve the strategy action 
plan maritime area in the Atlantic area.3 The countries parties should be Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal, while stronger forms of cooperation 
                                                   
1 European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a European Union Black Sea Strategy 
(2010/2087 (INI)), P7_TA (2011) 0025. cooperation, namely security and good governance, energy, 
transport and the environment, and finally economy, social and human development. To conclude, the 
financial instruments to support the strategy are the same, for example, of the Danube strategy: the 
EU’s structural and direct funds, Horizon 2020, the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA) and 
the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI). 
2 ECO/306-CESE 1298/2012, Brussels, 24.5.2012. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning Action Plan for a 
Maritime Strategy in the Atlantic area. Delivering smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels, 
13.5.2013, COM(2013) 279 final. 
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should be established with Iceland, Norway, Greenland and Faeroe Islands. The 
profiles to be exploited obviously refer to the maritime dimension around which 
the strategy is set, while the shared economic, technological and cultural heritage 
includes activities such as fishing, shipbuilding, the metallurgical industry, 
engineering, research and science, ports, trade and maritime transport. 
The EU strategy for western and eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea builds on 
the request made in May 2012 to the European Economic and Social Committee by 
the Vice-Minister for European Affairs of Cyprus, on behalf of the incoming 
Presidency of his EU Council country, to draw up an exploratory opinion called 
“Developing a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean-the benefits for island 
Member States”. The request was promptly accepted by the EESC which adopted 
this act in December of the same year.1 Despite initial enthusiasm, however, the 
strategy is struggling to take off, mainly due to political instability and armed 
conflicts affecting the area. Just think of all the events developed by the so-called 
“Arab Springs” on (2011), the war in Syria that has been fighting for seven years 
and the many and varied countries that should participate in the strategy, focusing 
on the development and implementation of policies that can help the Mediterranean 
countries to strengthen their economic and social relations, the development of the 
economy, the productive realities and enterprises to make the region more 
competitive on the international scene and, finally, the implementation of a 
mechanism aimed at sustainable regional development. Lastly, as regards the 
prospects of the new macro-regional strategies, it is important to report the EP 
opinion expressed with the aforementioned resolution of 16 January 2018.2 To the 
question “A macro-regional Europe after 2020?” contained in the document-at first 
glance would have led to a positive response-the EP has responded in an elusive 
manner, focusing primarily on a better implementation and strengthening of the 
already existing macro-regional strategies.3 
 
                                                   
1 ECO/332 A macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean, Brussels, 12.12.2012 “OPINION of the 
European Economic and Social Committee on Developing a macro-regional strategy in the 
Mediterranean-the benefits for island Member States (exploratory opinion for the Cyprus 
Presidency)”. 
2 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2018 on the implementation of EU macro-regional 
strategies (2017/2040 (INI)). 
3 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2018 on the implementation of EU macro-regional 
strategies (2017/2040 (INI)) which states in paragraph 37 that 'the call for new strategies, such as the 
Carpathians, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean or the Iberian regions should not divert attention from 
the primary objective of deepening the implementation of existing RMS 
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11. Concluding Remarks 
Macro-regional strategies are an important tool in achieving the strategic objectives 
of the European Union, as well as an indispensable part of the Union's multi-level 
governance.1 The establishment of four strategies in just six years (EUSBSR the 
first in 2009, EUSALP the latest in 2015) testifies to the favor enjoyed by these 
instruments of territorial cooperation in the European Union, first and foremost in 
the EC. In recent times, however, we are witnessing a sort of fogging of the 
process, due to a multiplicity of motivations among which the most important seem 
to be, at least in the opinion of the writer: (a) the implementation problems of 
existing strategies, which, as illustrated above, they are convincing the European 
Institutions to “freeze” the launch of new strategies to aim at consolidating those 
already in operation; (b) the difficulties that the European Union as a whole is 
experiencing and which prevent it from giving impetus to other policies and the 
reference is obviously to epochal challenges which are undermining its 
foundations, such as the mismanagement of migratory flows and the relative 
disagreements between Member States, tensions concerning the definition of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, the complexity of the negotiations 
on the Brexit, the rising tide of populist and euro-skeptic parties and movements, 
the increased centrality of intergovernmental institutions, starting from the 
European Council, without considering the crises that seem quite dormant but 
which could re-emerge at any moment, such as the euro and that of security 
(terrorism); (c) complications that have in the meantime arisen in some quadrants 
potentially integrated into EU macro-regional strategies, such as the southern 
neighborhood (Maghreb and the Middle East) and the eastern neighborhood 
(Ukraine and the Black Sea basin in general), in which they are deflagrated crisis 
and in some cases real wars that have made it impossible to cooperate between 
states in view of the establishment of a macro-regional strategy. To all this add that 
in 2019 there will be elections for the renewal of the European Parliament. 
Since the result of the vote is decisive for the election of the president of the EC2131 
(and therefore for the composition of the Commission itself, given the powers of its 
                                                   
1 Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the implementation of macro-regional 
strategies adopted at the Plenary Session of 30 November-1 December 2017. 
2 As established by art. 17, par. 7 TEU: “Having regard to the elections to the European Parliament 
and after having carried out the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This 
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president in the appointment of the commissioners), it will be interesting to see 
what kind of commission will leave this meeting and assess its impact on current 
and future macro-regional strategies, given that the EC plays a major role in the 
establishment and operation of strategies, both from a political and a technical 
point of view. An EC deeply influenced by the expansion of populist and 
Eurosceptic parties and movements, could it also have repercussions on these 
particular instruments of territorial cooperation? And what kind? Plausibly, the 
scenarios could be two. The first one, characterized by a substantial indifference of 
the Commission that would lead to manage the existing strategies without giving 
an impulse to their further development. Basically, it would continue to provide 
technical support through its more relevant Directorates-General but without giving 
political input. The second scenario, on the contrary, could push the Commission to 
act, but for two diametrically opposed reasons. The first reason-which we could 
label as progressive-would see the improvement of the implementation of existing 
strategies and the creation of new ones to (a) favor and encourage the convergence 
between unbalanced territories from the socio-economic, infrastructural and 
technological point of view, (b) support the Union's enlargement policy and (c) 
contribute to the achievement of the general objectives of the European Union. The 
second reason-this time regressive-depends on the desire to break down in macro-
territories a European Union already less united, cohesive and supportive and 
crossed by tendencies to fragmentation, the return to the nation-states and the 
intergovernmental method and the attempt to “Renationalise” policies. In this 
sense, to proliferate macro-regional strategies, “balancing” the European Union in 
many macro-regions, perhaps endowing them with legal personality so as to make 
them weigh, for example, in the allocation of structural funds, in the formation of 
the norms and policies of Union (upward phase) and in the implementation of the 
obligations deriving from the European legal system (descending phase), could 
further undermine the pro-European project and decree the collapse of the 




                                                                                                                                 
candidate is elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If the 
candidate does not obtain a majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, proposes 
within one month a new candidate, who is elected by the European Parliament according to the same 
procedure (...)”. 
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